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BORROWING BY ANY OTHER NAME: WHY
PRESIDENTIAL "SPENDING CUTS" WOULD STILL
EXCEED THE DEBT CEILING
Neil H. Buchanan* & Michael C. Dorf*
On multiple occasions since mid-2011, the United States has come
perilously close to exhausting its borrowing authority under a statutory
limit commonly called the "debt ceiling." In prior work, we argued that,
in the event that the debt ceiling is reached, the President will face a
"trilemma" in which any realistic action he takes-defaulting on gov-
ernment obligations, raising taxes, or issuing debt in excess of the stat-
utory ceiling-would unconstitutionally usurp legislative power. We
argued that in such circumstances, violating the debt ceiling would be
the "least unconstitutional option. " Nonetheless, most pundits and
politicians, including the President, appear to assume that if the debt
ceiling is reached, default would be necessary. Here, we observe a pre-
viously unnoticed deficiency in this assumption: Default would not only
usurp congressional power to set spending levels; it also would not even
satisfy the debt ceiling, because failure to pay money due on government
obligations is a kind of borrowing, both for statutory and constitutional
purposes. A "loan" taken from the lender involuntarily is hardly better
than consensual borrowing. The government could avoid this result
only by expressly repudiating its obligations; doing so, however, would
violate even the very narrow construction of Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment advanced by those who treat default as the necessary
consequence of congressional failure to raise the debt ceiling.
INTRODUCTION
A federal law commonly known as the debt ceiling purports to limit
the amount that the government may borrow. What options would the
President have if Congress were to fail to amend the debt ceiling statute
to authorize sufficient borrowing to cover the gap between mandated
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School, and Senior
Fellow at the Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash University.
** Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. The authors
thank Nicholas Kelly, Justin Mungai Ndichu, and Trisha Pande for excellent research
assistance.
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spending and revenue raised through taxation? That issue has come to a
head four times since the middle of 2011 and could arise again, perhaps
as early as March 2015, when the most recent suspension of the debt ceil-
ing will expire. Although Republican Speaker of the House John
Boehner offered observers a pleasant surprise when he brought a "clean"
debt ceiling bill to the House floor in February 2014, by merely
suspending the debt ceiling for one year, rather than repealing it,
Congress reserved to itself the power to create future crises for President
Obama and his successors.
In a series of articles in the Columbia Law Review and the Columbia
Law Review Sidebar,' we argued that congressional failure to raise the debt
ceiling would present the President with a "trilemma." -' That is, the
President would have three main options, all of which would be bad.3
First, he could fail to pay some federal obligees in full and on time.4
Second, he could collect more tax revenue than the law authorizes.5
Third, he could order the Treasury to borrow enough money to avoid
default, even though that would require him to increase total borrowing
above the statutory limit.'
1. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 1175 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose]; Neil H.
Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt Ceiling: When
Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress and the President Should Consider
the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 32 (2013) [hereinafter
Buchanan & Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf,
Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat Once and for All: Why the President Should Embrace
the Least Unconstitutional Option, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 237 (2012) [hereinafter
Buchanan & Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling].
2. E.g., Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1196-97 (explaining,
thanks to "interaction of the spending law, the tax law, and the debt ceiling law,"
President "faces a 'trilemma': a choice between three bad options, all of which are
unconstitutional").
3. Id. at 1197.
4. Id. at 1179 ("Failure to pay bondholders, contractors, employees, and other
persons entitled to money under federal law would have violated Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, in addition, the President's obligation to 'take Care that the
Laws' creating the relevant obligations 'be faithfully executed' . . . ." (quoting U.S. Const.
art. II, § 3)).
5. Id. (describing "unilateral actions to increase government revenue, such as a presi-
dential decree raising taxes or a presidential sale of government property without congres-
sional authorization" as violating separation of powers).
6. See id. (" [I] ssuing new debt without congressional authorization would ... vio-
late[] the separation of powers . . . ."). In both our prior work and here, we call the
President's predicament a trilemma for analytical clarity. A President could mix and match
unauthorized spending cuts, unauthorized taxation, and unauthorized borrowing in order
to bring the ledger into balance. In addition, he could usurp other powers, such as selling
government property without congressional authorization. Thus, a full account of the
President's options would describe them as presenting a "multilemma."
2014] 27
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR
These three options are not merely bad, however; they are all uncon-
stitutional. Even so, we argued that the Constitution guides a President's
choice among nothing but unconstitutional options.' Facing a trilemma
would not give a President a free pass, but would instead force him to
choose how to do the least constitutional damage, even when Congress
has failed in its duties under the Constitution. For reasons that we
briefly review below, we concluded that the President's least unconsti-
tutional choice would be to issue additional debt, in the minimum
amount necessary to cover all federal obligations.'
In this Essay, we return to these issues to make two new points. First,
we show that the President would still violate the debt ceiling, even if he
purported to honor the debt ceiling by breaching the government's legal
obligations through unilateral "spending cuts." 0 He would do so
because he would almost certainly be forced to promise that the people
whose obligations had not been paid would ultimately be made whole. In
so doing, the President would not only have usurped Congress's author-
ity under the spending power (by failing to pay the bills that Congress
had committed the nation to pay), but he would also have kept alive the
very obligations that would push the total level of federal debt above the
statutory limit. A promise to pay is, after all, a debt-not simply accord-
ing to common sense but also in light of the technical language of the
relevant statutes." The unilateral imposition by the President of forced
loans from government obligees would thus usurp Congress's borrowing
power as well. "Borrowing" money without consent of either Congress or
the lender is hardly better, from a statutory or constitutional viewpoint,
than borrowing without the consent of Congress but with the lender's
consent. And from a moral and policy viewpoint, it is clearly worse.
To be sure, the President could avoid breaching the debt ceiling and
avoid unauthorized borrowing by repudiating outright the obligations
that came due after the Treasury had exhausted its ability to finance
ongoing expenditures. But this brings us to our second key point: If the
President were to repudiate government obligations, then he would be
engaging in a clear violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which forbids the United States from doing anything that would cause
"the validity of the public debt" to be "questioned."
The trilemma argument we have previously developed rests solely on
principles of separation of powers. Even so, public discussions of debt
ceiling doomsday scenarios have sometimes assumed that the Fourteenth
7. See id. at 1197.
8. Id. at 1198.
9. See id. at 1243.
10. We put "spending cuts" in quotation marks because, as we explain below, the
President cannot actually cut spending. What most commentators describe as spending
cuts are better described as presidential default. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
11. See infra Part IIA.
12. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
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Amendment poses the only constraint on a President's unilateral deci-
sion not to spend the money that Congress has ordered him to spend.
Some leading proponents of unilateral default argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment only forbids outright repudiation of spending obligations,
and not mere delays in payment.1 3 We think that such a reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment is too narrow, but here we put that disagree-
ment aside to note what even the skeptics acknowledge: Actual repudia-
tion of federal debt would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, even if one thinks that unilateral presidential spending cuts
are, in our schema, the least unconstitutional option, or even if one
rejects our entire framework because she thinks that unilateral presiden-
tial spending cuts do not usurp Congress's spending power,1 4 unilateral
presidential spending cuts are still problematic because they would still
present a dilemma: Anyone who wants to say that the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be used to justify paying the government's bills by
borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling can do so only by saying that any
unpaid obligations will eventually be paid in full; doing that, however,
keeps alive debts that exceed the debt ceiling, which is a usurpation of
Congress's borrowing power.
Under our original analysis of the separation of powers, the
President would be required to honor the spending and taxing laws by
setting aside the debt ceiling law. He thus would be forced to choose one
constitutional violation, because that would be a less serious violation
than the two alternatives. We continue to believe that this analysis is cor-
rect, and, with the exception of conclusory statements to reporters and
short opinion pieces,1 5 no other scholars have even engaged with our
framework for analysis, much less seriously challenged our conclusions
under that analysis.
Our argument here, however, reaches the same conclusion via a
different route. Even if one doubts (or outright rejects) our "least
13. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, The Debt Ceiling Is Certainly Not
"Unconstitutional," Advancing a Free Society (July 4, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://www.
advancingafreesociety.org/exclusive/topics/economics/the-debt-ceiling-is-certainly-not-un
constitutional/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining, in event debt ceiling is
reached, "executive branch will have to make the tough decisions about priorities" as to
which payments to postpone); see also Michael Stern, "Threatening Default": A Response
to Professor Balkin, Point of Order (July 1, 2011, 6:04 PM), http://www.pointoforder.com/
2011/07/01/threatening-default-a-response-to-professor-balkin/ (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) ("Thus, whatever protection the Clause affords, it applies only to 'debt' and
not to 'obligations."').
14. But see Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1199-201 (explaining
why this view is mistaken).
15. See Michael C. Dorf, Trilemma Watch Continued: Still No Real Substantive
Engagement With Our Argument (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/
2013/10/trilemma-watch-continued-still-no-real.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (compiling list of critiques and expressing frustration with their "shallowness" and
failure to address the original argument).
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unconstitutional option" analysis, congressional failure to increase the
debt ceiling would force the President to violate the debt ceiling anyway,
either by formally issuing additional debt to prevent a default or by
breaching the government's obligations in a way that exceeds the debt
ceiling. His only alternative would be to repudiate those obligations,
which would simply violate the Constitution in a different way.
The combined import of our analysis is that a decision by the
President to default on the government's obligations would violate the
Constitution in two independent ways. He would usurp Congress's
spending power, and he would also either usurp Congress's borrowing
power or violate the Fourteenth Amendment. By contrast, issuing debt
sufficient to prevent default would "only" violate the borrowing power,
and-of some consequence-it could prevent a global economic crisis
that would be set into motion by the first-ever default in United States
history.
The balance of this Essay proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we briefly
recount how the unprecedented strategy of Republicans in the House of
Representatives brought the country to the point at which the possibility
of default needed to be discussed, and we provide an overview of the
range of options that have been considered by politicians, scholars, and
other commentators, including our own analysis. In Part II, we explain
why presidential default would still require exceeding the debt ceiling
and usurp congressional authority to borrow money. In Part III, we ex-
plore a previously overlooked connection between the Fourteenth
Amendment and separation of powers, explaining why presidential
default can only avoid a violation of the latter by violating the former. In
Part IV, we contest the view that political constraints take our approach
off the table and argue instead that, just as politics can constrain law, so
too can effective legal arguments shape politics.
I. THE UNPRECEDENTED DEBT CEILING STRATEGY AND THE RESPONSE IT
PROVOKED
Throughout the democratic world, governments routinely pass laws
that dictate certain levels of spending, as well as laws that dictate how
much tax revenue will be collected. The difference between spending
and revenue, if positive, is financed by borrowing money from the public.
Because the U.S. Constitution explicitly confers upon Congress the pow-
ers to spend, tax, and borrow, 6 it is necessary for Congress to explicitly
authorize the borrowing that its spending and taxing laws implicitly
require.
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises. . . ."); id. cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To
borrow Money on the credit of the United States . . . ").
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A government can function without a debt ceiling. In fact, we are
unaware of any other government (within our federal system, or in
another country) that currently operates in the shadow of a debt ceiling
law.17 In 1917, Congress passed the first debt ceiling law in the United
States." This was actually an attempt, during World War I, to smooth the
procedures for borrowing by placing all borrowing authorization in a
single statute, rather than having to pass piecemeal borrowing authoriza-
tions over time. 9 Congress thus passed a law that allowed the President
to borrow what was needed to execute the budgetary laws. In 1939, how-
ever, Congress effectively turned that law into a strict limit, in dollars, on
total borrowing by the federal government.2 0 Because the debt limit was
not expressed as a percentage of potential national income,21 periodic
increases in the debt ceiling were required, because the rapidly growing
economy was (unsurprisingly) accompanied by increases in the dollar
amount of debt.
The existence of a debt ceiling, however, need not create political or
budgetary gridlock. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, the so-
called Gephardt Rule in the House of Representatives specified that any
17. Australia had a debt ceiling law until very recently. The ceiling had never become
binding, and in 2013, after seeing the havoc resulting in the United States from debt
ceiling-related politics, the Australian Parliament repealed it. See Gareth Hutchens, Joe
Hockey Cuts Deal with Greens to Scrap Debt Ceiling, Sydney Morning Herald (Dec. 4,
2013), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/Joe-hockey-cuts-deal-with-
greens-to-scrap-debt-ceiling-20131204-2yqph.html#ixzz2mUf9i87F (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (citing "imported Tea-Party style debate" as contributing to repeal
decision (internal citation omitted)).
18. Sarah Binder, Op-Ed., Proposing the Unprecedented to Avoid Default: The Law,
N.Y. Times: Room for Debate (Jan. 13, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/
roonifordebate/2013/01/13/proposing-the-unprecedented-to-avoid-default/debt-ceiling-
was-meant-to-aid-borrow-not-limit-it (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also
Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (current version at 31
U.S.C. § 3105(a) (2012)).
19. Binder, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) ("The face amount of obligations issued under this
chapter and the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed
by the United States Government ... may not be more than $14,294,000,000,000,
outstanding at one time . . . ."). Our analysis here clearly shows that there is no good rea-
son to have a debt ceiling statute. If one were to try to write a debt ceiling law that was at
least somewhat coherent, however, it would need to limit the debt as a percentage of
potential gross domestic product (GDP), not actual GDP. This is because a recession
would (by definition) cause GDP to decrease below its potential, which-if a debt ceiling
were expressed as a percentage of actual GDP-would require debt to be reduced during
a recession, through some combination of tax increases and spending cuts. This, in turn,
would only make the recession worse, which would then require further tax increases or
spending cuts, and so on. See Neil H. Buchanan, Good Deficits: Protecting the Public
Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 Va. Tax Rev. 75, 95 (2011) ("Given that tax increases and
reductions in spending tend to shrink the economy (at least in the short run), a govern-
ment that wishes to reduce its overall debt must balance that desire against the danger of
creating (or worsening) a recession or depression." (footnote omitted)).
2014] 31
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR
spending or taxing law that required an increase in borrowing would
automatically increase the debt ceiling by the necessary amount."
Republicans ended that rule when they regained the majority in the
House in 1995.23
In 2011, as the legally relevant measure of the federal debt neared its
statutory limit, the new Republican majority in the House decided to
pursue an unprecedented strategy. House Republicans would refuse to
increase the debt ceiling, even though doing so would be necessary to
avoid default-that is, they would not allow the government to borrow
enough money to execute the budgetary laws that the full Congress,
including the House itself, had approved-unless the President and
Senate Democrats agreed to approve deep cuts in future spending.
Among knowledgeable commentators, the most reasonable reaction
to that new political strategy was incredulity.24 It seemed implausible that
the majority party in one house of Congress could so badly misund-
erstand the difference between refusing to pay the obligations to which
Congress had already committed the United States, and reducing spend-
ing in the future. Although there had been prior episodes in which the
necessity to vote to increase the debt ceiling had briefly been used to
embarrass a President,2 5 no one had ever seriously supposed that either
of the political branches (or either political party) could be forced to
make concessions on policy simply to prevent the government from
defaulting on its obligations.26 The United States had never failed to
meet its obligations, yet the Republican House majority in 2011 suddenly
22. See H.R. Doc. No. 94-661, at 351 (2013) (" [T]he 'Gephardt rule' used to provide
a mechanism for a joint resolution establishing the public debt limit to be automatically
generated upon the adoption of the concurrent resolution of the budget.").
23. H.R. Res. 149, 104th Cong. (1995). The Gephardt Rule is also known as "Rule
XXVIII," which was the name given to it after its most recent reinstatement in 2001. The
rule was ultimately repealed by the 112th Congress in 2011. See H.R. Doc. No. 94-661, at
353 n.1 (chronicling Rule's history of reinstatement and repeal).
24. See generally Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Ceiling Disasters: How the
Republicans Created an Unnecessary Constitutional Crisis and How the Democrats Can
Fight Back (2013) (reviewing contemporary commentary on Republican congressional
tactics).
25. One such occasion occurred in 2006, when then-Senator Obama cast a vote
against increasing the debt ceiling-but only after it was clear that the increase would pass,
notwithstanding his vote. Devin Dwyer, Gibbs: Senator Obama Only Voted Against Raising
Debt Ceiling in 2006 Because He Knew It Would Pass Anyway, ABC News: Political Punch
(Jan. 5, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/01/gibbs-senator-
obama-only-voted-against-raising-debt-ceiling-in-2006-because-he-knew-it-would-pass-an/
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
26. In some prior political tussles over the debt ceiling, such as in 1985, matters be-
came so heated that it became necessary for the Treasury to engage in "extraordinary
measures" to avoid default, while the principals reached an agreement. See Mindy R. Levit
et al., Cong. Research Serv., R41633, Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential
Effects on Government Operations 4 (2013). However, in no previous incident had the
avowed strategy of either party amounted to a commitment to allow the United States to
default unless that party's policy demands were met.
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insisted that it would allow the government to default unless the
President and the Democratic majority in the Senate capitulated to
House Republicans' political demands.
As a consequence of the resulting political standoff, the United
States reached the debt ceiling in May 2011, at which point the Treasury
Department engaged in "extraordinary measures" to provide additional
time for political negotiations to continue.27 Ultimately capitulating to
many of the Republicans' demands, the President and his party agreed to
immediate deep cuts in federal spending, as well as a series of further
across-the-board cuts in spending in 2013 and 2014.28 In return,
Republicans allowed an increase in the debt ceiling by an amount suffi-
cient to avoid default through the end of 2012.21
When it again became necessary to increase the debt ceiling, in late
2012, the President announced that he would no longer permit the debt
ceiling to be used as a bargaining chip in partisan negotiations. The
Republican majority in the House, along with many Republicans in the
Senate, initially acted as though they thought the President was bluffing,
and thus held out until the eleventh hour. In both February and October
2013, after political standoffs that each came within days of causing fed-
eral default, bills were passed to suspend the debt ceiling temporarily.
The same result was reached in February 2014, when the Republican
Speaker capitulated without putting up a serious fight.3 o
Whether that surrender marks the end of debt ceiling brinksman-
ship remains to be seen. The 2014 debt ceiling suspension passed with
only twenty-eight Republican votes in the House 3  and no Republican
votes in the Senate (although twelve Republican Senators did vote for
cloture) .32 Should the composition of either body change even modestly,
the political calculations could change as well, and the debt ceiling could
once again be used as a bargaining chip.
27. Id. at 6.
28. The political standoff over the debt ceiling ended with the passage of the Budget
Control Act of 2011. Provisions of the Act included an increase in the debt ceiling, and a
series of automatic federal spending cuts set to begin in 2013 and take place through
2021. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §§ 101, 301, 125 Stat. 240, 241-
45, 251-55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
29. See id. § 301, 125 Stat. at 251-55.
30. See Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Senate Leaders Avert Debt
Ceiling Crisis, N.Y. Times (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/us/
politics/senate-debt-ceiling-increase.html? r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("Republican leaders ... collectively decided that they needed to quickly dispose of the
debt ceiling fight . . . ").
31. See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, House Approves Higher Debt Limit
Without Condition, N.Y. Times (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us
/politics/boehner-to-bring-debt-ceiling-to-vote-without-policy-attachments.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) ("Only 28 Republicans voted yes. . .
32. Parker & Weisman, supra note 30.
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Throughout this series of political ordeals, political analysts and
legal scholars questioned whether the debt ceiling was constitutional.
Was a law that could only be used irresponsibly, to prevent the govern-
ment from paying its obligations, necessarily be in conflict with the
Constitution? Were there other laws or constitutional principles that
could be used to circumvent or neutralize the serious threat posed by the
debt ceiling (or at least to neutralize the threat posed by the House
Republicans' tactic of using the debt ceiling opportunistically to force
concessions from their opponents that they could not otherwise extract)?
The prior literature on these questions was understandably sparse.
Precisely because the legal consequences that could flow from the misuse
of the debt ceiling statute are so serious, and the practical consequences
of default almost unthinkably severe, few scholars could have imagined
that it would be necessary even to address the situation in which the
country first found itself in 2011.
In the ensuing three years, several strands of argument have
emerged regarding the debt ceiling. First, there are suggestions that the
debt ceiling can be neutralized by financial gimmicks that would allow
the government to continue to pay its bills without formally breaching
the debt ceiling. Second, a small literature has emerged regarding the
question of whether the debt ceiling violates Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
The first suggested response to the debt ceiling-financial maneu-
vers designed to evade the debt ceiling by seeming to follow the letter of
the law, in an attempt to avoid a constitutional crisis-includes several
variations on the same theme, the most well-known of which is the
"trillion-dollar coin option," under which the U.S. Treasury would
exploit a supposed loophole in the Coinage Act to mint platinum coins
with nominal values as large as necessary to cover the government's
financial needs. We considered platinum coins and similar options in our
first Columbia Law Review article on the debt ceiling, as well as in our
popular writings; and we not only concluded that such gimmicks would
be unwise, but that they do not even avoid the constitutional difficulties
that misuse of the debt ceiling would cause. 3 4
33. See, e.g., Jacob D. Charles, Note, The Debt Limit and the Constitution: How the
Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Fiscal Obstructionism, 62 Duke L.J. 1227, 1231 (2013)
(arguing Congress violates Public Debt Clause "by causing the validity of the public debt to
be questioned"); Kelleigh Irwin Fagan, Note, The Best Choice Out of Poor Options: What
the Government Should Do (or Not Do) If Congress Fails to Raise the Debt Ceiling, 46
Ind. L. Rev. 205, 207 (2013) (analyzing Public Debt Clause in light of Congress's failure to
raise debt ceiling). For an early analysis of this issue, published long before the recent
political showdowns over the debt ceiling, see Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced
Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 Tulsa L.J. 561 (1997).
34. See, e.g., Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1231 (noting objec-
tions to "jumbo coin proposal"); Neil H. Buchanan, Big Coins, Political Credibility, and
Hatred of Lawyers, Dorf on Law (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:07 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/
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The second widely discussed response to the threat of a debt ceiling
crisis is that the President should invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's
"Public Debt Clause," which prohibits actions that "question[]" the
"validity" of the public debt.15 We have found significant merit in that
argument, although we understand why the imprecise wording of, and
sparse postenactment case law interpreting, the relevant clause could
leave some room for doubt about how to determine its meaning.
Meanwhile, the Obama White House has explicitly rejected both
exotica like platinum coins and the possibility of invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment as grounds for issuing debt in excess of the statutory
ceiling. 6 Moreover, the President seems to assume that, because he has
decided not to invoke either of those two "Hail Mary" approaches to
dealing with Republicans' threats not to increase the debt ceiling, there
is only one simple and obvious path that the President must follow. As
the White House Press Secretary has repeatedly stated, there are only two
options: Either the debt ceiling is increased, or we must default on our
obligations for the first time in history.
That statement is simply incorrect. As we have argued in our schol-
arly articles and popular writing, one cannot simply assume that the debt
ceiling trumps all other budgetary laws. If a President were ever to be in
the position where the debt ceiling had become truly binding, he would
face a trilemma in which each of his realistic options would be
unconstitutional.
Our trilemma analysis starts with the essential point that there is no
"safe position" that the President can rely upon. That is, he faces nothing
but unconstitutional options. Nonetheless, much of the policy conversa-
tion has been based on the erroneous belief that the President would be
forced to commit a default on some of the government's legally obli-
gated payments if the debt ceiling is not increased as needed. Although
that would be one of his options, it is not the only one. More importantly,
it is not constitutionally "safe."
When we say that the President would face a trilemma, we mean that
he would have to choose among three constitutionally forbidden options:
refusing to pay money that Congress appropriated; trying to collect reve-
nues in excess of the amounts that Congress specified; or borrowing
more than Congress authorized. All three of those actions by the
2013/01/big-coins-political-credibility-and.html [hereinafter Buchanan, Big Coins] (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting problems with trillion-dollar-coin solution).
35. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
36. Catherine Thompson, Obama Dismisses Using Trillion Coin, 14th Amendment
Argument to Resolve Debt Ceiling, Talking Points Memo (Oct. 8, 2013, 3:01 PM), http://
talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/obama-dismisses-14th-amendment-argument-for-lifting-
debt-ceiling (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
37. E.g., Jay Carney, White House Press Sec'y, Press Briefing (Oct. 1, 2013), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/01/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-
carney-1012013 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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President would violate the Constitution, because each of them would
see the President usurping Congress's Article I powers to spend, tax, or
borrow. 38
Our point was not and is not that the President violates the
Constitution whenever he violates a statute. As one scholar correctly but
irrelevantly noted in a blog post, every statutory violation is also, trivially,
a constitutional violation, because every statutory violation by the
President violates his constitutional duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.39 Our point is that a President's decision to tax more,
borrow more, or spend less than Congress has authorized amounts to a
presidential decision to make for himself a policy decision that the
Constitution commits to Congress-whereas the President's constitu-
tional role in lawmaking is limited to proposing, signing, or vetoing bills.
The point is easy enough to see with respect to taxing and borrow-
ing. Suppose Congress had never authorized any taxes or borrowing at
all. If the President were then to impose some new tax or to borrow
money, purportedly on his own authority, the separation of powers viola-
tion would be the very one to which we have called attention, even
though no statute would be violated.
Based on public discussions of the issue by politicians and a few legal
commentators, however, it appears that there continues to be some
confusion as to why failing to spend appropriated funds amounts to a
nontrivial violation of the Constitution. As we have discussed in all three
of our prior articles, the spending power allows Congress (and Congress
alone) to decide exactly how much money to spend, and on which
projects.40 This power fundamentally involves the setting of priorities,
with different amounts of spending expressing Congress's collective judg-
ment about the relative importance of, say, sugar price supports, cancer
research, military pensions, early childhood nutrition subsidies, and so
on.
If the President were to fail to pay for Congress's spending priorities,
on time and in full, he would violate the Constitution by usurping
Congress's spending power. This was the basis of the Impoundment
Crisis during Richard Nixon's Presidency,4 1 which resulted in Congress
38. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
39. Eric Posner, Three Ways Obama Could Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own: The
Controversial, Risky Options if Congress Doesn't Act, New Republic (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115034/debt-ceiling-3-ways-obama-could-
circumvent-congress (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
40. Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1199-200; Buchanan & Dorf,
Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 1, at 40-42; Buchanan & Dorf, Nullifying the Debt
Ceiling, supra note 1, at 244-47.
41. See Editorial, Don't Blame the Budget Process, N.Y. Times (Oct. 7, 1982), http://
www.nytimes.com/1982/10/07/opinion/don-t-blame-the-budget-process.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Impoundment Crisis and implications for
budget control).
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passing the Impoundment Control Act, specifically to prevent a President
from deciding not to follow Congress's full orders regarding spending.4 2
And as we have repeatedly explained, the Supreme Court's decision in
the line-item veto case, Clinton v. New York, makes clear that unless
Congress specifically authorizes the President to spend "up to" certain
sums, congressional appropriations are to be satisfied in exact amounts,
with presidential noncompliance treated as a nontrivial constitutional
violation.43
Thus, a President would commit a serious constitutional violation
(one that is, we would add, potentially an impeachable offense) if he
were to default on any U.S. obligation to pay money under the law. Our
analysis does not, however, simply assume away the fact that the
President's other options-taxing or borrowing without Congress's
authorization-are also unconstitutional. The identification of the tri-
lemma is merely the starting point of the analysis. The key question is
what to do, when all paths are unconstitutional.
We identified three criteria that should guide a President in choos-
ing the best path forward. First, he should do what can most easily be
reversed (if Congress later decides that it does not like his choice)."
Second, he should do as little "legislating" as possible, by choosing the
option that minimizes the need for the President to make the sorts of
judgments and to strike the sorts of balances that Congress engages in
when it passes laws.4 5 And third, he should eschew options that, even if
arguably legal, would have such extreme real-world consequences as to
be worse than violating the Constitution.46 We concluded that borrowing
the amount necessary to carry out Congress's taxing and spending laws,
even if that requires an amount of borrowing that exceeds the debt ceil-
ing, clearly meets those criteria, and is thus the least unconstitutional
option. 47
Although some legal scholars and other commentators have
expressed disagreement with some of our conclusions, there does not
appear to have been any scholarship arguing the contrary view-that
when faced with a trilemma, a President should not violate the debt
ceiling because doing so would be more unconstitutional than defaulting
on the government's obligations would be. 48 Because some comment-
42. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688).
43. 524 U.S. 417, 445-47 (1998).
44. Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1214-15.
45. Id. at 1200-01.
46. Id. at 1209-10.
47. Id. at 1243.
48. Note that we do not discuss here the third option, which is to have the President
increase taxes unilaterally. We dealt with that question in our first article, but because the
real-world debate has been over only two prongs of the trilemma, we continue to focus
only on the borrowing-versus-defaulting question.
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ators (and apparently the White House itself, given its stated belief that it
would be forced to default) appear to hold that view, however, we have
attempted to respond even to the most cryptic comments that express
disagreement with our view. Here, we extend our arguments to deal with
possible objections that might be raised against our position.
II. THE PARADOX OF DEBT: DEFAULTING ON OBLIGATIONS To AVOID
EXCEEDING THE DEBT CEILING DOES NOT AVOID EXCEEDING THE DEBT
CEILING
In our scholarship to date, we have assumed that a presidential deci-
sion to default would usurp congressional authority to decide how much
money to spend, but that it would not violate the Constitution in any
other way. In particular, we have assumed that refusing to explicitly bor-
row in excess of the debt ceiling would at least achieve its obvious imme-
diate goal-allowing the President to avoid exceeding the debt ceiling.
He would, under this view, usurp the spending power, but he would not
usurp the borrowing power.
As it turns out, however, that concession to our (largely hypothet-
ical) critical interlocutors was not warranted. Indeed, the President can-
not prevent the government from exceeding the debt limit, nor from
usurping Congress's borrowing power-even if he defaults on required
payments under the appropriations laws. These surprising results follow
from the statutory definition of debt and the constitutional meaning of
borrowing.
A. The Statutory Definition of Debt
The debt ceiling statute defines "debt" to include more than the
government securities that are periodically issued by the Treasury
Department.49 In a well-crafted attempt to guarantee that form will not
dominate substance, Congress wrote the debt ceiling law specifically to
include both Treasury securities and a broader, catch-all category of
other obligations in its definition of the debt that is covered by the debt
ceiling.so
49. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3106 (2012) (enumerating types of "obligations" that
count towards debt ceiling).
50. The statutory cap applies to the sum of " [t]he face amount of obligations issued
under this chapter and the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are
guaranteed by the United States Government." 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (emphasis added).
That is, the statute first refers to "obligations" of the federal government issued under
chapter 31 of title 31 of the U.S. Code, which authorizes the issuance of the Treasury
bonds, notes, and bills through which the federal government generally borrows money.
The section then separately refers to all other obligations that are backed by the federal
government. See Buchanan, Big Coins, supra note 34 ("The first category applies to the
usual Treasury securities .... If Congress wanted the law to limit only the total amount of
formal Treasuries, it [would not have] ... added that second category."). As we discuss
below, unless the principal amount of any unpaid obligations is repudiated outright, the
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This means that, if a President were to avoid selling securities merely
by putting the government into debt in some other way, the President
would not successfully evade the debt ceiling. And this is precisely what
the President would be doing if he were to default on the government's
obligations. He would presumably express regret at the delay in payment,
saying that the debt ceiling prevented him from borrowing the funds
necessary to make good on the payments that have come due; and he
would assure the disappointed obligees that the money would be coming
as soon as possible.
But to provide such assurances, of course, is to recognize that the
government is in debt to the people who have not yet been paid. The
President, rather than borrowing money from people who voluntarily
exchange their money now on the promise of receiving principal plus
interest later, would force the government's obligees-possibly including
Social Security recipients, Medicare providers, military contractors, and
so on-to become its unwilling lenders." The President would, there-
fore, not have avoided exceeding the debt ceiling at all. Instead, he
would have chosen to increase the debt by denying payment to the very
people who have the most right to expect payment in full on a specific
date.
When does an obligation become a debt? The U.S. Code does not
define "obligation" but an answer emerges both from logic and the
overall structure of the Code. An obligation becomes a debt exactly on
the date that the payment is due. Either the obligation is paid and thus
extinguished, or it is unpaid and becomes a debt going forward. This
basic logic also means that it is inappropriate to include future obliga-
tions (whether measured in nominal dollars, or in net present value) in
the measurement of debt. Subject to broad constitutional limits on
altering vested rights," future obligations can be altered. For example,
Congress could change the formula for paying Social Security benefits
without committing a default on legal obligations, even though current
recipients may expect that the existing benefit levels will not be changed.
principal and interest (if any is promised) on those unpaid obligations are guaranteed by
the federal government. (Note also that, pursuant to the Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3901-3907 (2012), money due on federal contracts is called "debt," including interest
for late payments.) Nothing in the U.S. Code defines "obligations" in a way that would
exclude from the debt ceiling's ambit the obligations that Congress creates when it legally
commits the government to pay obligees in full, on dates certain. Nor should it, because
the statute is clearly an attempt (though ill-considered in all of the other ways that we have
identified here and elsewhere) to limit the federal government's total exposure to legal
claims for payment-that is, to limit its total obligations.
51. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3907 (characterizing money due to such obligees as
"debt").
52. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547-48 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part) (describing case law under Due Process Clause limit-
ing retroactive legislation).
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Until those benefits come due, such expectations, no matter how reason-
able, are not constitutionally protected.
Importantly, this current-versus-future distinction also explains why
it is important to describe the President's constitutional violation as a
"default" rather than "cutting spending." Even though the constitutional
power at stake is the spending power conferred upon Congress, a presi-
dential decision to violate the spending power by refusing to disburse the
funds that Congress has required to be disbursed constitutes a default.
Congress "cuts spending" when it passes a budget that reduces the
amounts appropriated to be paid during that year, compared to previous
years. The President cannot cut spending, but instead can either faith-
fully execute Congress's spending decisions" or default upon them.
This broader meaning of the word "debt" is also supported by the
language Congress used when writing the Prompt Payment Act, which
guarantees that federal contractors will be paid in full on the dates
specified in legally binding contracts.54 Under that law, the President is
required either to pay the contractors in full, as specified by law, or to
pay interest on the unpaid balance.'" Notably, Congress specifically used
the word "debt" to describe those unpaid balances.'" There is nothing
exceptional about that usage, reflecting, as it does, the common-sense
understanding that money not paid on time becomes a debt. Absent any
indication to the contrary in statutory text, there is every reason to treat
the government's failure to make other payments on time as becoming
debt.51
Furthermore, Congress's treatment of the "extraordinary measures"
that the Treasury has occasionally used to avoid default speaks to the
question of what counts as debt under the law. During an earlier standoff
over the debt ceiling, the Treasury temporarily recharacterized debt
securities used to finance federal pension obligations as essentially "not
debt," allowing it to finance other obligations without defaulting, while
53. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (requiring President to "take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed").
54. 31 U.S.C. § 3902 (setting interest penalties).
55. Id. In the situation described above, where the President announces a default, he
could announce that he will (as soon as Congress agrees) make sure that the disappointed
obligees will be paid interest during the period of default. Whether he does so or not, of
course, does not mean that default is not a breach of the debt ceiling. It merely raises the
question of whether the forced loans will also be interest-free borrowing by the govern-
ment. Weighing against the bad public relations of refusing to promise to pay interest
would be the desire to avoid admitting that these really are forced loans in the first place.
56. See id. § 39 0 2(e) ("An amount of an interest penalty unpaid after any 30-day
period shall be added to the principal amount of the debt, and a penalty accrues thereaf-
ter on the added amount.").
57. For example, although it does not use the term "debt," the relevant provision of
the Social Security Act acknowledges the government's obligation to make additional
payments to persons who are underpaid. 42 U.S.C. § 404 (2006).
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still claiming not to exceed the debt ceiling." Congress later explicitly
approved of that accounting maneuver, designating various pension
funds as eligible for such treatment. 9 Congress thus indicated that it
views itself as able to define debt for purposes of the debt ceiling.
B. The Constitutional Definition of Borrowing
Within very broad limits, Congress can define terms in the laws that
it writes, but even when Congress uses language that closely tracks the
Constitution, a statutory definition is not necessarily coextensive with the
corresponding constitutional language. To give an example that received
considerable attention in the recent past, the Supreme Court held that
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's minimum coverage
provision was a tax for constitutional purposes but was not a tax for pur-
poses of the Anti-Injunction Act. 0 Although this distinction befuddled
many political commentators, there was nothing remotely novel about
treating a word or phrase to mean one thing for purposes of statutory
construction and something else for purposes of constitutional law."
It is at least possible, therefore, that a violation of the debt ceiling
law would not be a violation of the provision of the Constitution's Article
I, Section 8 assigning to Congress the power to "borrow Money on the
credit of the United States."6 2 If such "borrowing" is not the same as
accumulating "obligations" under the debt ceiling law, it would be poss-
58. Levit et al., supra note 26, at 4 (detailing Treasury's actions in 1985 to "meet the
government's cash requirements" after reaching statutory debt limit).
59. Id. Notwithstanding our statement above that the debt ceiling law is "well-crafted"
in its closing of a particular potential loophole, see supra text accompanying note 50, the
law does strangely identify as debt purely internal accounts of the federal government. The
"debt held by the public" is much lower than measured debt, mostly because of the inter-
nally held securities in the Social Security Trust Funds. Treasury Dep't, TreasuryDirect,
The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/
current (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). This raises
different questions about Congress's definitions of debt, to which we will turn
momentarily.
60. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582-83, 2594 (2012).
61. For example, title 28 of the U.S. Code mirrors the language of Article III in its
grants of diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. Yet the Supreme Court
long ago held that both statutory grants are narrower than their constitutional counter-
parts. Compare Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 755-65 (1824) (offer-
ing very broad definition of cases "arising under" federal law as term is used in Article III),
with Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908) (restricting
cases "arising under" federal law as term is used in statutory language found now in title
28 to those in which federal issue appears on face of plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint);
compare also Haas v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank of Miami Beach, 442 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir.
1971) ("[T]he diversity statute requires complete diversity of citizenship." (citing
Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941))), with State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (holding Article III requires only minimal diversity).
62. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
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ible for a President to take actions that violate the debt ceiling law with-
out violating the Constitution, or vice versa.
In fact, there are limited circumstances in which a presidential
action that violated the debt ceiling would not also usurp congressional
power to borrow under Article I, Section 8. As noted above, Congress's
definition of "debt" in the debt ceiling law is, one might say, idiosyn-
cratic.6 3 Congress includes in its measure of debt the total value of all
Treasury securities in existence, including those that are held internally
by various government retirement funds such as the Social Security
system. 64 Those securities represent nothing more than accounting
entries that credit the funds for previous overpayments, to be used to
cover anticipated future payments if revenues fall short. They are, in
other words, not current obligations. They only represent money that
might need to be borrowed in the future, depending on future congres-
sional choices about benefits and revenues in those programs.
Therefore, if the President were to unilaterally declare that the
Social Security Trust Fund contained additional Treasury securities, he
would violate the debt ceiling (assuming that the debt ceiling had already
been reached). Because he would not have borrowed money on the
credit of the United States from anyone outside of the government, how-
ever, he would not have usurped Congress's borrowing power, and he
would thus not have committed a constitutional violation.
Certainly, however, defaulting on the government's external obliga-
tions would violate both the debt ceiling statute6 5 and the language of
Article I, Section 8.66 The President, by forcing people to "agree" tempo-
rarily to allow the government not to pay them money to which they are
entitled, would be borrowing money on the credit of the United States,
in an amount that exceeds the total amount authorized by Congress. He
would thus not only violate Congress's spending powers by defaulting on
legal obligations, but he would do so by borrowing money from unwilling
obligees.
Perhaps it could be argued that the "borrowing" power referenced
in Article I only includes conventional, that is to say voluntary, loans. If
so, an objection might go, when the President defaults he does not actu-
ally usurp congressional borrowing power, even if his action would
increase the federal government's "obligations," as defined by the stat-
ute. But this objection fails for two reasons.
First, we have found nothing in the records of the Constitutional
Convention, the ratification debates, or the postratification history that
63. See supra note 59 (citing Congress's use of word "debt" to describe money owed
from one government account to another).
64. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3106 (2012).
65. Id. § 3101(b).
66. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To borrow Money
on the credit of the United States . . . .").
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suggests that forced loans are not loans. To be sure, Founding Era
documents also do not affirmatively indicate that forced loans would be
considered loans. The issue appears not to have arisen, in theory or in
practice. From a purely semantic perspective, however, the original
understanding appears to be consistent with the view expressed here.
Thus, Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary-the leading linguistic author-
ity in the colonial era-provides, as its primary definition of "borrow,"
the following: "To take something from another upon credit."' 7 Perhaps
that definition implies consent of the borrower, but if so, Johnson's
secondary definition-"To take something of another" 6 8-makes clear
that in the eighteenth century, as today, the term "borrow" could be
used to encompass loans to which the lender does not consent.
Second, if congressional power to "borrow" only encompasses con-
sensual loans, that merely exacerbates the constitutional offense. After
all, if forced loans are not an exercise of the power to borrow money,
then they are not an exercise of any enumerated power. Congress has the
power to tax;6 9 the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause tacitly acknowl-
edges congressional power to appropriate property if it provides just
compensation;70 but no provision of the Constitution empowers
Congress, the President, or any other federal actor to steal, so long as the
stolen property is later returned. Thus, if the Article I power to borrow
does not encompass forced loans, then presidential default would not
merely amount to the exercise of power by the wrong branch; it would
amount to the exercise of power that is denied to the federal government
in its entirety.
Accordingly, whether or not Congress has the power to take forced
loans, the President has no such power. Thus, a presidential decision to
default rather than to issue new debt to voluntary purchasers would not
substitute a Spending Clause7 1 violation for a Borrowing Clause72 violation.
It would add a Spending Clause violation to a Borrowing Clause violation
and/or a Tenth Amendment violation.7 ' By choosing default, the
President would violate the Constitution twice (or perhaps even thrice)
with one decision.
67. Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, at M4 (Dublin, W.G.
Jones for Thomas Ewing, in Dames, 3d ed. 1768), available at Google Books.
68. See id.
69. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
70. See id. amend. V (" [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."). But cf. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain
Power, 122 Yale L.J. 1738, 1792-93 (2013) (arguing that, as originally understood,
Congress only had power of eminent domain with respect to property in federal
territories).
71. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
72. Id. cl. 2.
73. Id. amend. X.
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III. THE UNEXPECTED INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE TRILEMMA ANALYSIS
A. The Public Debt Clause
In our original article analyzing the President's options if
Republicans were to refuse to increase the debt ceiling, we considered an
argument based on the "public spending clause" of Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." That clause specifies that the "validity of the
public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts in-
curred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned."" The argument is
that the existence of a debt ceiling (and the potential of a default that
the debt ceiling necessarily implies) brings the validity of the public debt
into question, and thus violates the Constitution.
We concluded that there is much to be said for this argument. Even
though "validity" and being "questioned" are hardly models of clarity in
drafting, it is still reasonable to conclude that a law that raises the specter
of default would violate that clause. 6 We also addressed the question of
what counts as "debt" under that Amendment, and we showed that the
tendentious claim that it only includes Treasury securities (but excludes
required payments under the appropriations laws) would logically-but
absurdly-allow the government to default on interest payments, so long
as it paid back the principal amounts borrowed."
Even though we believe that there is merit to the argument that the
debt ceiling statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment, we have be-
come increasingly convinced that it is neither necessary nor prudent to
rely on the Fourteenth Amendment to conclude that the debt ceiling is
unconstitutional. If one were to agree with those who dismiss the
Fourteenth Amendment argument, after all, one would still be left with
the question of what the President must do if he is ever faced with a
trilemma. The suggestion by politicians and commentators that the
President can "choose to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment" implies
that his constitutional obligations are somehow optional." Even if he
were able to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment argument, however, the
President would not be in the clear. He would still have to make an un-
constitutional choice.
74. See Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1205-08; see also U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
75. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
76. Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1189-90.
77. See id. at 1180, 1192.
78. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling and a Way Out,
N.Y. Times (July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/politics/25legal.
html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing President Obama's rejection of
former President Clinton's suggestion that unilateral invocation of Fourteenth
Amendment to raise debt ceiling would be constitutional).
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In any case, our trilemma-based argument has nothing to do with
the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, our argument above that unilat-
eral presidential decisions to default on obligations (in violation of
Congress's spending power) simply are unilateral presidential borrowing
is completely independent of any additional constitutional constraints
imposed by Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think that this
logical independence is evident from what we have said here and else-
where, but we make the point expressly because in public debate about
the President's choices in the face of congressional failure to raise the
debt ceiling, commentators frequently mistake any and all arguments
about what the Constitution as a whole requires for arguments about
what the Fourteenth Amendment in particular requires.7 9
B. The Original Understanding of the Public Debt Clause
Is there any basis for the conflation of our trilemma analysis with the
Fourteenth Amendment argument? We can certainly imagine a critic
objecting that our argument regarding the "least unconstitutional
option" does depend on our view of the constraints imposed by Section 4
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such critics have offered a very narrow
reading of the Public Debt Clause, a reading under which only outright
repudiation of federal debt is forbidden. 0 Therefore, a critic could say
that if the Reconstruction Congress thought it necessary to enact a pro-
hibition on repudiation of debt, surely Article I could not have already
forbidden mere temporary failure to pay promisees. For if such tempo-
rary failure to pay promisees were already forbidden, then, a fortiori,
outright repudiation would also already have been forbidden, and there
would have been no reason to add Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
What can we say in response to that (thus-far-only-hypothetical)
objection? We could vigorously contest the claim that Section 4 only
forbids outright repudiation, pointing to Perry v. United Statesi and our
prior exposition of the Clause"2 but doing so would only play into the
critic's hands. "Aha!" we imagine him exclaiming. "So your latest argu-
79. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sparshott, Longshot Debt Ceiling Ideas Explained, Wall St. J.:
Wash. Wire (Oct. 9, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/10/09/
longshot-debt-ceiling-ideas-explained/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
how attempt to rely on Fourteenth Amendment in isolation to grant President power to
pay back public debt clashes with Congress's grant of power under Article I to "pay the
debts").
80. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 13 (reading "public debt" to include "public
debts and pension obligations" but not any "other spending" required by law).
81. 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935) (describing "validity of the public debt," as used in
Section 4 of Fourteenth Amendment, "as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of
the public obligations").
82. See Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 1, at 1188-94 (arguing best
reading of Section 4 would forbid more than outright repudiation).
2014] 45
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR
ment is dependent on your view of the Fourteenth Amendment, after
all."
And indeed, that would be a fair rejoinder if all we could do is con-
test the critic's contention that Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
only forbids repudiation. But that is not all we have to say in response to
the critic. Even conceding arguendo that the Fourteenth Amendment
only forbids repudiation, the critic's attack misses its target.
In Part II, we explored the implications of the assumption that the
power to borrow does not include the power to extract forced loans. 3 We
think that is a mistaken reading of the Constitution, but if it is correct, it
creates more, not fewer, difficulties for a President who chooses to
default. To return to our own affirmative argument, we emphasize that
neither here nor in any of our prior work do we claim that Article I or
the Tenth Amendment forbids the United States-as opposed to the
President-from failing to pay promisees. Putting aside the Fourteenth
Amendment, if the United States makes a contract to pay a firm for
goods or services, and then receives those goods or services, but Congress
refuses to allocate funds to pay the firm, the United States will have
breached the contract and, absent renegotiation, will have extracted a
forced loan from the contractor.
Even so, the United States will not have acted in violation of Article
I, Section 8 or the Tenth Amendment. Put simply, our affirmative argu-
ment is that Article I forbids the President from borrowing money without
congressional authorization, whether he does so by borrowing from vol-
untary participants in the bond markets or by borrowing from govern-
ment obligees to whom he decides to delay payment. In either case, the
President will have acted unconstitutionally because he will have usurped
congressional power. But of course Congress cannot usurp congressional
power, and so our trilemma argument in no way depends on any sort of
claim that the antebellum Constitution forbade Congress from failing to
pay its debts.
Thus we have a perfectly logical account of Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming that it merely forbids repudia-
tion. The Reconstruction Republicans feared that once the delegations
from the states of the former Confederacy were readmitted to Congress,
a majority of Congress might repudiate Union debt." As the price of
readmission, these states were made to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment, including its Section 4."
83. See supra Part II.B (discussing constitutional definition of "borrowing").
84.Jack Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Balkinization (June 30, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/
legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
85. 2 Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 230-34 (1998) (interpret-
ing extraordinary ratification procedure as final stage in constitutional moment).
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C. Repudiation and Default
To this point, therefore, we have established that the trilemma-based
analysis is independent of any claim that the debt ceiling runs afoul of
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is important, however, to
note an unexpected implication of the claim that the Public Debt Clause
only forbids outright repudiation. Under this view, a President does not
bring the validity of the public debt into question unless he announces
that he will not repay that debt at all, not merely that he is delaying pay-
ment (with or without interest).
In Part II we noted that a President who wishes to avoid violating the
debt ceiling could not merely say that he is not taking on additional debt
by refusing to sell additional Treasury securities. 6 Again, if he defaulted
on obligations as they came due, he would be borrowing money from
unwilling lenders, to be paid at a later date. This would amount to
borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling, which in turn would violate the
allocation to Congress of the borrowing power in Article I, Section 8.
The only way out of that difficulty would be for the President to
repudiate those debts. He could not, moreover, simply refuse to call
them debts, because until he repudiates them, they would be unpaid
debts of the United States. To repudiate them is to acknowledge that
they exist at all.
Therefore, even though we are willing to allow for the possibility
that the critics of the Fourteenth Amendment argument might define
the key terms of Section 4 in a way that would defeat the standalone
Fourteenth Amendment argument, those definitions would ultimately
come back to create a logical vise for the President. A presidential deci-
sion to default on the government's obligations would necessarily violate
the Constitution in one of two ways (in addition to usurping Congress's
spending power): Either that default would increase the debt, violating
Article I, Section 8, or that debt would have to be immediately repudi-
ated, violating Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. THE POLITICS OF TIMIDITY
Here and in our prior work, we have treated the choices that a
President would face if Congress fails to provide adequate borrowing
authority as posing legal questions. Yet the debt ceiling crises present
political questions as well. Some legal scholars have therefore suggested
that our analysis is irrelevant. In one version of this critique, the
President cannot follow any other course but default because to do so
would be to fall into an impeachment trap. 7 Yet the three parts of the
trilemma combine to create an unavoidable impeachment trap, because
86. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
87. Trevor Morrison, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., Statement at Columbia Law
School Public Discussion (Feb. 21, 2013).
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any choice the President makes would violate the Constitution. 8 In
another, more radical version of this critique, a trilemma simply calls into
play the President's supposed power to do what needs to be done to
rescue the country, with legal mumbo-jumbo to be offered only as a fig
leaf."9
Although we do not hold ourselves out as political experts, we do
think that these criticisms are misguided to the extent that they treat pol-
itics as simply constraining the sorts of legal arguments that can be ad-
vanced. In fact, causation runs in both directions. Politics constrains legal
options but legal arguments can also inform politics. More broadly, the
boundaries of what is politically possible are not static.
The entire conversation around the debt ceiling reflects a too-timid
view of the possibility that reason may inform politics. From the very
beginning of the recent crises, we and all other responsible commen-
tators have repeatedly urged Congress simply to repeal the debt ceiling
statute, which serves no constructive purpose while threatening serious
harm to financial markets and the real economy.90 Yet for political
reasons, a Congress that prematurely turned to deficit reduction during a
severe recession was deaf to that advice. To repeal the debt ceiling would
be to invite the inane but inevitable charge of profligacy-even though
the debt ceiling itself is utterly unnecessary to setting any particular level
of government deficits and debts.
The White House has pushed back against the idea that a vote to in-
crease the debt ceiling is a vote for profligacy, but the pushback only
came after President Obama negotiated with House Republicans under
threat of default in the summer of 2011.91 Moreover, the President and
the Democratic Party generally accepted the dubious macroeconomic
logic underlying the Republicans' premature push for deficit reduction,
leaving them poorly positioned to make their case against anything
88. Neil H. Buchanan, Difficult Political Choices in the Shadow of the Debt Ceiling,
Dorf on Law (Feb. 22, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/02/difficult-
poltical-choices-in-shadow-of.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
trilemma and impeachment trap).
89. See Posner, supra note 39 (describing legal strategies as "legalistic argle-bargle
necessary to take [the President] from A to B" if Congress refuses to raise debt limit).
90. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Op-Ed., Obama Should Override
the Debt Ceiling, CNN (Jan. 11, 2013, 11:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/11/
opinion/buchanan-dorf-debt-ceiling (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Our leaders
can still act responsibly by raising the debt ceiling or, better yet, by repealing it entirely.");
James Surowiecki, Smash the Ceiling, New Yorker (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.newyorker.
com/talk/financial/2011/08/01/110801ta talk surowiecki (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (" [T]he United States doesn't need, and shouldn't have, a debt ceiling.").
91. See Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Debt Limit Bill After Nasty Fight, CBS News
(Aug. 2, 2011, 4:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-signs-debt-limit-bill-after-
nasty-fight/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing President Obama's hard-
won compromise to increase nation's borrowing power).
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called a "debt ceiling."9 2 Perhaps pushback on the economics would not
have been effective anyway. Since the early years of the Clinton
Presidency, Democrats have sought to portray themselves, rather than
Republicans, as the party of fiscal rectitude.9 3
Whatever factors explain the parties' positions on macroeconomic
policy, the President has thus far missed an opportunity to shape-rather
than merely react to-the legal conversation over debt ceiling doomsday
scenarios. Threatening default as the inevitable outcome of a congres-
sional failure to raise the debt ceiling is an effective strategy for ensuring
that Congress raises the debt ceiling, in the same way that mutually
assured destruction is an effective strategy for avoiding a nuclear war-
until it isn't. At that point, one must answer questions that one has been
trying desperately to avoid.
We have previously explained why issuing new debt to cover the gap
between authorized expenditures and revenues would be the least
unconstitutional path in the post-apocalyptic world-and, we should add,
the path most likely to minimize the extent of that apocalypse.9 4 We have
also explained why announcing that view in advance could make the
apocalypse less likely.9" In this Essay, we have shown that the alternative
that so much of the policy establishment embraces without explana-
tion-presidential "spending cuts"-would not even honor the debt ceil-
ing statute. It would have all of the flaws that we have previously noted, as
well as the very flaws commonly attributed to unilateral presidential bor-
rowing. The emperor has no clothes.
CONCLUSION
In our prior work, we argued that, when faced with a trilemma, issu-
ing debt in violation of the debt ceiling would be the President's least
unconstitutional option. We disagreed with those scholars and commen-
92. Cf. Ruy Teixeira, Does the Public Reward Obama's Proposals to Cut
Entitlements?, ThinkProgress (Apr. 12, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
economy/ 2013/04/12/1857131 /does-the-public-reward-obamas-proposals-to-cut-entitle
ments/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing President's compromise strategy
unlikely to pay off or result in "elusive bipartisan Grand Bargain on debt reduction").
93. See Jonathan Martin, Some Democrats Look to Push Party Away From Center,
N.Y. Times (July 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/us/politics/some-
democrats-look-to-push-party-away-from-center.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing "growing frustration among progressives" who want party to move towards
more populist position of economic fairness).
94. Buchanan & Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 1, at 53; Buchanan &
Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling, supra note 1, at 247-48.
95. See Buchanan & Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling, supra note 1, at 248-49 (argu-
ing Administration's refusal to acknowledge constitutional imperative to raise additional
debt can hasten both default and constitutional crisis); Buchanan & Dorf, Bargaining in
the Shadow, supra note 1, at 51-52 (arguing same, even when Congress and President
negotiate a budget with knowledge of impending exhaustion of borrowing authority
under debt ceiling).
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tators who argued that, under such circumstances, the President should
instead default on some government obligations, but we understood
them to be arguing for an alternative to our proposal. Our analysis here
shows that in fact default is not an alternative to borrowing in excess of
the debt ceiling. It is simply a more dangerous, less effective, and more
unconstitutional method of violating the debt ceiling.
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